We present a technique for proving the security of quantum-key-distribution ͑QKD͒ protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Classical key distribution schemes can only be secure under strong assumptions-e.g., that the computing power or the storage capacity of a potential adversary is limited. In contrast, quantum key distribution ͑QKD͒ allows for provable security under the sole assumption that the laws of physics are correct. This ultimate security is certainly one of the main reasons why so much theoretical and experimental effort is undertaken to investigate QKD protocols and, in particular, to make them practical ͓1-3͔.
One of the most challenging theoretical problems in the context of QKD is to determine sufficient and/or necessary conditions for the security of QKD protocols. This is exactly what we are concerned with in this paper. To be more precise, we investigate the security of a general class of QKD schemes which includes the most popular ones such as the Bennett-Brassard 1984 ͑BB84͒ , the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 ͑B92͒ protocols ͓4-6͔. Our results hold with respect to a model where two legitimate parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob, are connected by a quantum channel as well as an authentic, but otherwise fully insecure, classical channel. 1 We assume that Alice's source as well as Bob's detector is perfect, whereas an adversary ͑Eve͒ might have full control over the quantum channel.
2 QKD protocols can usually be divided into a quantum and a classical part: In the quantum part, the transmitter ͑Alice͒ sends qubits ͑or more generally, some d-level physical systems͒ prepared in certain states to the receiver ͑Bob͒. The states of these qubits are encodings of bit values randomly chosen by Alice. Bob performs a measurement on the qubits to decode the bit values. For each of the bits, both the encoding and decoding are chosen at random from a certain set of operators. After the transmission step, Alice and Bob apply a sifting where they publicly compare the encoding and decoding operators they have used and keep only the bit pairs for which these operators match.
Once Alice and Bob have correlated bit strings, they proceed with the classical part of the protocol. In a first step, called parameter estimation, they compare the bit values for a randomly chosen sample of their strings, which gives an estimate of the quantum bit error rate ͑QBER͒-i.e., the fraction of positions where Alice and Bob's strings differ. Note that the QBER is a direct measure for the secrecy of Alice and Bob's strings, since any eavesdropping strategy would, according to the laws of quantum mechanics ͑no-cloning theorem͒, perturb the correlations between them.
3 If the QBER is too high, Alice and Bob decide to abort the protocol. Otherwise, they apply a classical (post-)processing protocol to distill a secret key, using either one-way or two-way classical communication. One-way post-processing protocols usually consist of error correction and privacy amplification. 4 For the error correction, Alice sends certain information to Bob such that he can reconstruct Alice's string. Once Alice and Bob have identical strings, privacy amplification is used to compute a final key on which the adversary has virtually no information. We shall see that the performance of such one-way protocols can generally be increased if Alice additionally applies some preprocessing to her initial string before starting with the error correction.
Any realistic quantum channel is subject to noise. Consequently, even in the absence of an adversary Eve, the QBER 1 If Alice and Bob initially share a short key, they can use a classical authentication scheme in order to implement an authentic channel.
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One possibility to deal with imperfections of the source or the detector is to include them in the model of the quantum channel ͑where dark counts might, e.g., be replaced by random bits͒. This, however, corresponds to a situation where Eve has partial control over these devices, which might be unreasonable is nonzero. On the other hand, Eve might in principle replace the real ͑noisy͒ quantum channel with an ideal noise-free channel and could thus tap mildly into the quantum communication such as to introduce precisely the original amount of noise. Hence, when proving the security of a protocol, one has to assume that all the noise is due to Eve. This raises the following question: What is the maximum QBER-i.e., the maximum tolerated channel noise-such that Alice and Bob can still generate a secure key? Clearly, the answer to this question depends on the amount of information that Eve might have gained by her attack.
Ideally, one does not want to impose any restriction on Eve's power. That is, any strategy allowed by the laws of physics has to be considered. On the other hand, the set of all possible attacks is usually difficult to handle. In order to cope with these conflicting objectives, three classes of attacks have been considered. The smallest class only contains the so-called individual attacks, where Eve is restricted to interacting with each of the signal systems sent by Alice separately. That is, for each of the signal systems, Eve attaches an auxiliary system and applies some fixed unitary operation. Finally, Eve measures each of these systems individually right after the sifting step-i.e., before Alice and Bob start with the classical processing. The class of collective attacks ͓7,8͔ is defined similarly, but the last requirement is dropped. That is, Eve might wait with her measurement until the very end of the protocol. In particular, the measurement she chooses might depend on the messages Alice and Bob exchange for error correction and privacy amplification. Moreover, she might measure all her auxiliary systems jointly. The security analysis of a protocol against collective attacks ͑see, e.g., ͓9͔͒ can be seen as a step towards proving security in the most general case-i.e., against coherent attacks. The latter includes any attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. In particular, Eve might let all the signal systems interact with one large auxiliary system, which she only measures at the very end of the protocol.
Many 5 of the previous security proofs of QKD protocols are based on the following observations ͓12-15͔.
͑i͒ Instead of preparing a system in a certain state and then sending it to Bob, Alice can equivalently prepare an entangled state, send one of the qubits to Bob, and later measure her subsystem. In doing so, she effectively prepares Bob's system at a distance.
͑ii͒ If the joint system of Alice and Bob is in a pure state, then it cannot be entangled with any third party; in particular it cannot be entangled with any of Eve's auxiliary systems. Hence, simple measurements provide Alice and Bob with data totally oblivious to Eve.
͑iii͒ If furthermore the state shared by Alice and Bob is maximally entangled, then their measurement results are maximally correlated. Hence, if Alice and Bob performed some entanglement purification protocol ͓16,17͔, they would end up with the desired secret bits.
͑iv͒ Since one is interested in the security of protocols implemented with nowadays technology, Alice and Bob's operations should not require the storage of quantum states; i.e., one does not want them to run a general entanglement distillation protocol. To overcome this problem, one uses the fact that certain entanglement distillation protocols are mathematically equivalent to quantum error correction codes. There exists a class of such codes, called CSS codes, which have the property that bit errors and phase errors can be corrected separately. Since the final key is classical, its value does not depend on the phase errors. Hence, Alice and Bob actually only have to correct the bit errors, which is a purely classical task.
This method for proving the security of QKD protocols is very elegant, but raises two different questions. First, is the detour via entanglement purification really necessary? Is it optimal? Or might other methods lead to better results? Second, must all cryptographers learn the intricate theory of entanglement? Is there an explanation of the results within the language of information theory? As we shall see, the theory of entanglement purification, as explained above, is not necessary and also too pessimistic ͑from Alice and Bob's point of view͒.
In fact, we present a technique for proving the security of QKD protocols which does not rely on entanglement purification. Instead, it is based on information-theoretic results on the security of privacy amplification ͓18,19͔. These results were first applied in ͓20͔ to analyze the security of a generic QKD protocol similar to the one we are considering here 6 ͑see also ͓21͔ for a similar approach͒. Since secret key agreement might be possible even if the state describing Alice and Bob's joint system before error correction and privacy amplification does not allow for entanglement distillation, our method can lead to more optimistic results than any method based on entanglement purification.
In addition, we prove security with respect to a so-called universally composable security definition. The underlying idea is to characterize the security of a secret key by the maximum probability that it deviates from a perfect key which is uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary's information ͑see Sec. II B for a formal definition͒. This implies that the key can safely be used in any arbitrary context, except with some small probability . Remarkably, this is not the case for most of the known security definitions ͑cf. discussion in ͓19͔͒.
One interesting example illustrating the strength of our technique is the BB84 protocol or the six-state protocol, where, in the classical processing step, Alice additionally adds some ͑large͒ amount of noise to her measurement data. We show that, surprisingly, this noise generally increases the rate at which Alice and Bob can generate secret key bits. However, the density operator describing Alice and Bob's system after the noise has been introduced is not entangled; 5 This is not true for the first security proof of QKD against the most general attacks due to Mayers ͓10͔, which is based on different techniques. Also, the security proof of Biham et al. ͓11͔ uses different ͑information-theoretic͒ methods. 6 The proof technique introduced in ͓20͔ applies to most of the known protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification ͑but without preprocessing͒. It is based on the result of ͓18͔ and the fact that the rank of a purification of Alice and Bob's joint system can be bounded.
i.e., the technique of entanglement purification cannot be applied in a straightforward way.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, we describe and analyze a generic QKD protocol using one-way classical post-processing. According to the discussion above, the protocol is subdivided into a quantum and a classical part. In Sec. II A, which is devoted to the quantum part, we review our result presented in ͓22͔. It states that the density operator describing Alice and Bob's information after the quantum communication can be considered to be a symmetric ͑with respect to permutations of the qubit pairs͒ Bell-diagonal state. The classical part of the protocol is then studied in Sec. II B. Using some recent results of classical and quantum information theory ͓19,23͔, we analyze the performance of the classical post-processing. In Sec. III, we combine the main statements of Secs. II A and II B and derive an expression for the secret-key rate which only involves a minimization over a certain set of two-qubit states which correspond to collective attacks. In Sec. IV, we give an upper bound on the secret-key rate for any protocol with one-way classical postprocessing, again involving only two-qubit density operators. Finally, in Sec. V, we apply our methods to the BB84, the six-state, and the B92 protocols. In addition, we show that the efficiency of each of these protocols can be increased if one of the parties adds noise to her measurement data.
II. GENERAL QKD PROTOCOL USING ONE-WAY COMMUNICATION
In this section, we describe a general class of QKD protocols employing one-way classical post-processing. This class contains the BB84, the six-state, and the B92 protocols ͓4-6͔, among many others. Each of these protocols consists of a quantum and a classical part: The quantum part includes the distribution and measurement of quantum information, and is determined by the operators Alice and Bob use for their encoding and decoding. Section II A is devoted to the analysis of this part. Generally speaking, we review our result proven in ͓22͔ which states that the density operator describing Alice and Bob's system after the distribution of quantum information can be assumed to be symmetric ͓cf. Eq. ͑1͔͒. Section II B deals with the classical part of the QKD protocol-i.e., parameter estimation and postprocessing. We first give a description of a post-processing scheme and then derive an expression for the maximum length of the key that this scheme can generate, depending on the information that Alice and Bob share after the quantum part of the QKD protocol.
To simplify the presentation of our results, we assume that the physical systems which Alice sends to Bob are qubits. However, a generalization to higher dimensions is straightforward. Throughout the paper, we use the following notation: Vectors ͑l 1 , ... ,l n ͒ are denoted by bold letters l. We use capital letters as subscripts for density operators-e.g., AB -to denote the subsystems they act on. A bold letter indicates that the corresponding subsystem is itself a product of many ͑identical͒ systems. Furthermore, for any state ͉⌽͘, P ͉⌽͘ = ͉⌽͗͘⌽͉ is the projector onto ͉⌽͘.
A. Quantum part: Distribution of quantum information and measurement
The quantum part of a QKD protocol is specified by the encoding and decoding operations employed by Alice and Bob. For the following, we assume that Alice uses m different encodings, with index j J ª = ͕1, ... ,m͖. For each j J, ͉ j 0 ͘ and ͉ j 1 ͘ denote the states used to encode the bit values 0 and 1, respectively.
In the first step of the protocol, Alice randomly chooses n bits x 1 , ... ,x n and sends n qubits prepared in the states The description of a QKD protocol as an entanglementbased scheme is very convenient for the security analysis. In particular, instead of considering the quantum communication between Alice and Bob, it suffices to have a characterization of the quantum state AB n held by Alice and Bob before they apply their measurements.
Consider now a slight extension of the protocol where Alice and Bob randomly permute the positions of the measured bit pairs and, additionally, at each position, flip the values of both bits with probability one half. In the entanglement-based version of the protocol, these ͑purely classical͒ operations can equivalently be applied to the initial quantum state AB n of Alice and Bob. For the following, we restrict our attention to the partial state AB n data containing only the n data particle pairs which are later used for the computation of the final key ͑but not for parameter estimation͒ and 7 Since we assume that the quantum channel is subject to noise ͑which might be controlled by the adversary͒, the state AB n is generally a mixed state. which are measured with respect to the z basis.
8 ͑To keep the notation simple, we write in the following n instead of n data .͒ The common bit flip is then described by the quantum operation x x . Moreover, we can assume that Alice and Bob apply random phase flips z z to their qubit pairs, since these do not change the distribution of the classical measurement outcomes. The resulting state AB n of Alice and Bob is thus given by AB n = D 2 n ͓P n ͑ AB n ͔͒ where the operator P n denotes the completely positive map ͑CPM͒ which symmetrizes the state with respect to permutations of the n qubit pairs and where the CPM D 2 describes the operation where both x x and z z are applied with probability 1 2 . This is equivalent to the random application of any of the operators 1 1, x x , y y , or z z ; i.e., D 2 can be interpreted as the action of a depolarizing channel transforming any two-qubit state to a Bell-diagonal state. Consequently, as shown in ͓22͔, AB n has the simple form AB n = ͚ n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 n n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 . ͑1͒
In this formula, the sum is taken over all n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 N 0 satisfying n 1 + n 2 + n 3 + n 4 = n and n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 are some ͑real-valued͒ non-negative coefficients. Moreover, n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 is the state of n qubit pairs defined by
where
. Note that the state AB n defined by Eq. ͑1͒ is, independently of the protocol, separable with respect to the different qubit pairs.
To prove the security of our protocol, we will assume that Eve holds a purification of AB n , which is the state describing Alice and Bob's joint system after they have applied the randomized permutation and bitflips. This is equivalent to saying that Eve knows everything that might be correlated ͑or entangled͒ with Alice and Bob's system. 9 In particular, the purification of AB n includes any information ͑on Alice and Bob's qubit pair͒ that Eve might compute when learning the actual permutation and bit flips 10 applied by Alice and Bob.
11 It is explained in ͓22͔ that, if the encoding operators A j are unitary, then this assumption is also tight; i.e., there actually exists an attack which provides Eve with this purification.
Formula ͑1͒ is already sufficient to prove our main results ͑see Sec. III͒. However, to simplify the analysis of certain protocols, it is often convenient to consider the additional symmetrization ͑see ͓22͔͒ given by the CPM D 1 defined by
Here p j ജ 0 determines the probability by which Alice and Bob decide ͑during the sifting phase͒ to keep their bits, if they have applied the operation A j B j , and N is used for the normalization. All classical data of Alice and Bob ͑including the bits used for parameter estimation͒ are then given by a measurement of the state D 2 n ͕D 1 n ͓P n ͑ AB n ͔͖͒ with respect to the z basis.
B. Classical part: Parameter estimation and classical postprocessing
This section is devoted to the description and analysis of the classical part of the QKD protocol. We will use here techniques which partly have been developed in ͓20͔. Assume that Alice and Bob already hold strings X = ͑X 1 , ... ,X n ͒ and Y = ͑Y 1 , ... ,Y n ͒, respectively, which they have obtained by measuring n-particle pairs AB n distributed in the first part of the QKD protocol, as described in Sec. II A. Their goal is to generate a secure key pair ͑S A , S B ͒, using X and Y.
The protocol we consider consists of two subprotocols, called parameter estimation and classical (post-)processing. The main purpose of the parameter estimation subprotocol is to estimate the amount of errors that have occurred during the distribution of the quantum information ͑see Sec. II A͒. To do this, Alice and Bob compare the measurement outcomes for some randomly chosen qubit pairs. If the quantum bit error rate QBER, they decide to abort the protocol.
In order to analyze a given QKD protocol, we need to characterize the initial states AB n for which the protocol does not abort. Clearly, this characterization depends on the threshold QBER. Let ⌫ be the set of all two-qubit states AB which correspond to a collective attack, meaning that there exists an operation of Eve such that AB n = AB n . The set ⌫ QBER is then defined as the subset of ⌫ containing all states AB for which the protocol does not abort ͑with probability almost 1͒. In other words, if AB ⌫ QBER , then the protocol is supposed to compute a secret key when starting with AB n = AB n . We will see in Sec. III that the characterization of the set ⌫ QBER is sufficient to compute lower bounds on the secretkey rate.
After the parameter estimation, if the estimate for the QBER is below the threshold, Alice and Bob proceed with a classical subprotocol in order to turn their only partially secure strings X and Y into a highly secure key pair ͑S A , S B ͒. The protocol we consider is one way; i.e., only communication from Alice to Bob is needed. It consists of three steps.
͑I͒ Preprocessing: Using her bit string X, Alice computes two strings U and V, according to some channels U ← X and V ← U, defined by conditional probability distributions P U͉X and P V͉U , respectively. She keeps U and sends V to Bob. ͑We will see that, for most protocols, the performance highly depends on a clever choice of U, whereas the string V is usually not needed.͒ ͑II͒ Information reconciliation: Alice sends error correction information W on U to Bob. Using Y, V, and W, Bob computes a guess Û for U. 8 We will see in Sec. III that one can always assume that all these particle pairs are measured with respect to the same basis. Indeed, conditioned on any measurement of Eve's system, Alice and Bob's joint system is in a pure state.
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Note that Alice and Bob have to communicate over an insecure classical channel in order to agree on the common random permutation and bit flips. Before starting with the analysis of this protocol, let us introduce some notation. It is most convenient to describe the classical information of Alice and Bob as well as the quantum information of the adversary Eve by a tripartite density operator XYE of the form
where ͕͉x͖͘ x and ͕͉y͖͘ y are families of orthonormal vectors and where E x,y is the quantum state of Eve given that Alice and Bob's random variables X and Y take the values x and y, respectively. Similarly, the classical key pair ͑S A , S B ͒ together with the adversary's information E Ј s A ,s B after the protocol execution is described by a quantum state
To define the security of the final key pair ͑S A , S B ͒, we use the universally composable security definition introduced in ͓19͔. The key pair ͑S A , S B ͒ is said to be secure ͑with respect to E Ј ͒ if
where SS ª ͚ sS 1/͉S͉P ͉s͘ P ͉s͘ and where ␦͑·, ·͒ denotes the trace distance. In other words, the state S A S B E Ј describing the key of Alice and Bob together with the adversary's quantum system is close to a product state SS E Ј where the partial state SS describes a pair of identical and uniformly distributed keys. This is equivalent to saying that, with probability at least 1 − , the keys S A and S B are equal to a perfect key S which is uniformly distributed and completely independent of the adversary's knowledge ͑cf. ͓19͔ for a proof͒. Hence, except with some small probability , Alice and Bob can safely use their key pair ͑S A , S B ͒ for any cryptographic task ͑e.g., for one-time-pad encryption͒ which is secure when using a perfect key S.
The goal of the remaining part of this section is to derive an expression for the number ᐉ ͑n͒ of -secure key bits that can be generated from n qubit pairs by the above protocol, for an optimal choice of the protocol parameters. For this purpose, we first consider some fixed preprocessing, specified by the channels U ← X and V ← U, for which we compute the maximum key length ᐉ U←X,V←U n . The quantity ᐉ ͑n͒ is then obtained by optimizing over all choices of the preprocessing.
Our result is formulated in terms of an informationtheoretic quantity, called smooth Rényi entropy ͓23͔ ͑see Appendix A for more details͒. Similarly to the Shannon entropy H͑X͒, the smooth Rényi entropy of a random variable X, denoted by H ␣ ͑X͒, is a measure for the uncertainty about the value of X. We will also need an extension of this entropy measure to quantum states. Similarly to the von Neumann entropy S͑͒, the smooth Rényi entropy S ␣ ͑͒ of a state quantifies the amount of randomness contained in .
The main ingredient needed for the following derivation is a recent result on the security of privacy amplification ͓19͔ ͑see lemma C.2͒. Generally speaking, it says that the length of the key that can be extracted from a string U held by both Alice and Bob is given by the uncertainty of the adversary about U, measured in terms of smooth Rényi entropies. Applied to the last step of our protocol, we get
where depends on the desired security of the final key and where the approximation "Ϸ" means that equality holds up to some small additive term of the order O(ln͑1/͒). In this formula, UVWE n is the density operator describing the strings U, V, and W, together with the adversary's knowledge-i.e., UVWE n = ͚ x,y,u,v,w P XYUVW ͑x,y,u,v,w͒P ͉u͘
where ͕͉u͖͘ u , ͕͉v͖͘ v , and ͕͉w͖͘ w are families of orthonormal vectors. Note that, since the channel connecting Alice and Bob might be arbitrarily insecure, the key must be secure even if the adversary knows V and W.
In the next step, we will eliminate the dependence on W in Eq. ͑6͒. For this, we consider the amount m of ͑useful͒ information contained in W. Since W is needed by Bob in order to guess U, m depends on his uncertainty about U. In fact, if an optimal error correction code is applied, then m is roughly equal to the entropy of U conditioned on Bob's information Y and V. More precisely, using lemma C.3 described in Appendix C, we have m Ϸ H 0 ͑U ͉ YV͒. Hence, when omitting W on the right-hand side of Eq. ͑6͒, the smooth Rényi entropies cannot decrease by more than m ͑see Appendix A for a summary of the properties of smooth Ré-nyi entropy͒. We thus immediately obtain
Since the channels U ← X and V ← U applied by Alice in the first step of the classical post-processing protocol are arbitrary, we can optimize over all choices of such channels. We thus conclude that the number ᐉ ͑n͒ of key bits that can be generated by the described protocol, for an optimal choice of all the parameters, is given by
In the following, we will often consider protocols where the strings U and V are computed bitwise from the string X. The maximum length of the secret key that can be generated by such a protocol is then given by an expression similar to Eq. ͑8͒, but where the supremum is only taken over bitwise channels U ← X and V ← U.
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For a definition and constructions of two-universal hash functions, see, e.g., ͓25͔ or ͓26͔.
III. LOWER BOUND ON THE SECRET-KEY RATE
The goal of this section is to derive a lower bound for the secret-key rate which only involves two-qubit states and which is thus easy to compute. For this purpose, we use the general expression ͑8͒ of Sec. II B for the number of key bits that can be generated from a given state, together with the fact that, after symmetrization, any state of Alice and Bob has the simple form ͑1͒.
Let us start with a description of our main result. Consider the QKD protocol described in Sec. II, where we assume that Alice uses bitwise channels U ← X and V ← U to compute U = ͑U 1 , ... ,U n ͒ and V = ͑V 1 , ... ,V n ͒, respectively, from her data X = ͑X 1 , ... ,X n ͒. Let ⌫ QBER be the set of two-qubit density operators AB defined in Sec. II B; i.e., the protocol aborts ͑with high probability͒ whenever it starts with a product state ͑ AB ͒ n for any AB ⌫ QBER . We show that, for an optimal choice of parameters, the protocol of the previous section generates secret-key bits at rate r ª lim n→ϱ ͑ᐉ ͑n͒ / n͒ where
In this formula, S͑U ͉ VE͒ denotes the von Neumann entropy of U conditioned on V and Eve's initial information-i.e., 13 and applying the measurement of Alice followed by the classical channels U ← X and V ← U. Similarly, Y is the outcome of Bob's measurement applied to the second subsystem of ABE .
As Eq. ͑9͒ involves a minimization over the set ⌫ QBER of two-qubit states, our lower bound on the secret-key rate only depends on the set of possible collective attacks. On the other hand, the security we prove holds against any arbitrary coherent attack. Note also that the statement extends to the situation where Alice-instead of applying a bitwise preprocessing on each of the n bits-uses some operation involving larger blocks-say, of length m. In this case, one has to consider all attacks U r where the adversary applies the same operation U on each of the r = n / m blocks.
A crucial task when computing explicit values for Eq. ͑9͒ is to characterize the set ⌫ QBER , This set is determined by the conditions under which the protocol aborts. In Sec. V, we will demonstrate how formula ͑9͒ is computed for concrete QKD schemes such as the BB84 or six-state protocol. It turns out that, in these examples, the maximum is taken if V ← U is the trivial channel where V is independent of U; i.e., the random variable V can be omitted.
One method to further reduce the number of parameters is to consider the set D 2 (D 1 ͑⌫ QBER ͒), which only contains normalized two-qubit density operators of the form i.e., Eq. ͑1͒ for n = 1. As mentioned in Sec. II A ͑see ͓22͔ for details͒, the state shared by Alice and Bob is-independently of the considered protocol-measured with respect to the z basis. Hence, we obtain for the QBER Q, computed as an average over the different encodings, Q = 3 + 4 . Apart from that, the state must be normalized, which implies that, for any given value of Q, there are at most two free parameters 2 and 3 -i.e., 1 =1−Q − 2 and 4 = Q − 3 . To prove Eq. ͑9͒, we will make use of a known result ͓20͔ on the relation between the statistics obtained when applying two different measurements E and F on the individual subsystems of a symmetric n-partite state n ͑cf. lemma C.1 in Appendix C͒. Let Z = ͑Z 1 , ... ,Z k ͒ be the outcomes when applying E to each of the first k subsystems of n , for k ഛ n, and let Q Z be the frequency distribution of the symbols in the string Z, i.e., for any possible measurement outcome z,
Similarly, let Q Z Ј be the frequency distribution of the out-
n − k subsystems of n . Lemma C.1 implies that, if k and kЈ are large enough, then, with probability almost 1, there exists a density operator on one subsystem which is compatible with both of these statistics. Formally, this means that Q Z Ϸ P E ͓͔ and Q Z Ϸ P F ͓͔, where P E ͓͔ and P F ͓͔ denote the probability distributions of the outcomes when measuring with respect to E and F, respectively. Moreover, the state is contained in a certain set B which, roughly speaking, contains all density operators which correspond to the state of one single subsystem of n , conditioned on any measurement on the remaining subsystems.
We are now ready to prove expression ͑9͒ for the secretkey rate. As in Sec. II A, we consider an extension of the protocol where, before invoking the classical part of the QKD protocol, Alice and Bob symmetrize their strings X and Y. More concretely, they both apply the same randomly chosen permutation on their strings. Clearly, this is equivalent to a protocol where Alice and Bob first permute and then measure their bits ͑see Sec. II A͒. The state AB n of Alice and Bob's system before the measurement is then symmetric. We can thus assume without loss of generality that the first n pe qubit pairs are used for the parameter estimation, while the actual key is generated from the measurement outcomes obtained from the next n data pairs.
Consider now some fixed protocol where the preprocessing is defined by the channels U ← X and V ← U. We show that this protocol is secure as long as the rate at which the key is generated is not larger than r U←X,V←U = inf
In other words, r U←X,V←U is the rate that can be achieved if the channels U ← X and V ← U are used for the preprocessing. The assertion ͑9͒ then follows by optimizing over all channels for the preprocessing.
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This means that AB diag has the same diagonal entries as AB with respect to the Bell basis.
The proof of Eq. ͑11͒ is subdivided into two parts. In the first part, we show that the parameter estimation works correctly; i.e., if the adversary introduces too much noise, then the protocol aborts. The second part of the proof is concerned with the security of the classical post-processing step; that is, if the noise is below a certain level, then the final key is secure.
For this analysis, we need to consider the joint state AB n pe +n data of the n pe qubit pairs used for parameter estimation and the n data pairs used for the classical post-processing. Additionally, in order to simplify the presentation of the proof, we assume that there is a small number n aux ª n − n pe − n data Ͼ 0 of auxiliary qubit pairs exchanged by Alice and Bob which are not used in the classical part of the protocol.
14 In order to analyze the structure of the state AB n pe +n data , we consider an imaginary measurement E Bell with respect to the Bell basis applied to each of these n aux auxiliary positions of AB n . We then prove the security of our QKD protocol conditioned on the statistics Q W of the outcomes W = ͑W 1 , ... ,W n aux ͒ of this imaginary measurement. 15 We show that the protocol is secure for any value of Q W , which implies that the protocol is secure in general ͑with probability almost 1͒.
Formally, let P E Bell ͓⌫ QBER ͔ be the set of probability distributions obtained by measuring the states AB ⌫ QBER with respect to the Bell basis. We prove the following two statements.
͑i͒ If Q W P E Bell ͓⌫ QBER ͔, then the protocol aborts after the parameter estimation; i.e., no key is generated.
͑ii͒ If Q W P E Bell ͓⌫ QBER ͔, then the key generated by the classical post-processing is secure.
To prove statement ͑i͒, let F be the measurement that Alice and Bob apply to each of the n pe qubit pairs used for parameter estimation and let Q pe be the frequency distribution of the measurement outcomes of F. Since the state AB n is symmetric, we can apply lemma C.1 described above, where B is defined by the set ⌫ of all two-qubit states characterizing the collective attacks of Eve ͑cf. Sec. II B͒. Consequently, there exists a state AB ⌫ ͑of a single qubit pair͒ which is compatible with both the statistics Q pe and Q W -i.e., P F ͓ AB ͔ϷQ pe and P E Bell ͓ AB ͔ϷQ W . Assume now that Q W P E Bell ͓⌫ QBER ͔. Because of P E Bell ͓ AB ͔ϷQ W , this implies that AB ⌫ QBER . Hence, by the definition of the set ⌫ QBER , the protocol aborts.
We proceed with the proof of statement ͑ii͒. For any frequency distribution Q, let AB͉Q W =Q n data be the state of the n data qubit pairs used for generating the final key, conditioned on the event that the statistics of the measurement outcomes of the n aux auxiliary pairs is equal to Q. Assume now that Alice and Bob measure their data bits according to one fixed basis, 16 called the z basis, and, additionally, apply common random bit flips. Then, according to the discussion in Sec. II A, it is sufficient to consider states of the form ͑1͒. In particular, the conditional state AB͉Q W =Q n data can be written as AB͉Q W =Q n data = ͚ n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 , ͑12͒
where n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 is defined by Eq. ͑2͒. Hence, if we applied the Bell measurement E Bell to each of the n data subsystems, then, for any 4-tuple ͑n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 ͒, with probability n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 , the resulting frequency distribution Q data would be equal to Q n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 ª ͑n 1 / n , n 2 / n , n 3 / n , n 4 / n͒. On the other hand, because of the permutation symmetry of the state AB n , we have Q data Ϸ Q W with probability almost one 1.
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Hence, the coefficients n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 can only be non-negligible if Q n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 is close to Q W = Q; that is, we can restrict the sum in Eq. ͑12͒ to values ͑n 1 , n 2 , n 3 , n 4 ͒ such that Q n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 Ϸ Q. Consider now the product state ͑ AB ͒ n data , where AB ª 1 ͓Q͔ is the two-qubit state depending on Q as defined by Eq. ͑10͒. Since the state ͑ AB ͒ n data is symmetric, we can also write it in the form ͑12͒, with some coefficients n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 Ј . Again, these coefficients can only be non-negligible if Q n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 is close to Q. Hence, the states AB͉Q W =Q n data and ͑ AB ͒ n data have the same structure ͑12͒ where the coefficients n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 and n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 Ј are negligible except for Q n 1 ,n 2 ,n 3 ,n 4 Ϸ Q. Indeed, it is a consequence of the results presented in Appendix A 3 that the smooth Rényi entropies of the states derived from AB͉Q W =Q n data are roughly equal to the corresponding entropies of the states derived from ͑ AB ͒ n data . To make this a bit more precise, let UVE͉Q W =Q n data be the state obtained when applying the measurement of Alice followed by the channels U ← X and V ← U to each of the subsystems of a purification of AB͉Q W =Q n data . Then, lemma A.4 implies that
where UVE is the state obtained from AB ª 1 ͓Q͔, as described after Eq. ͑9͒.
14 If this is not the case, one can always change the protocol such that some of the data bits are discarded, without reducing its rate.
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Note that the outcomes W of this imaginary Bell measurement on the auxiliary qubit pairs are only needed for the security analysis. In the actual protocol, Alice and Bob do never have to perform any measurement operation on the auxiliary qubit pairs. 16 If the data bits are measured with respect to different bases, the argument must be repeated for each basis. This is, however, usually not needed. In fact, for an optical performance of the protocol, one of the encodings should be chosen with probability almost 1 whereas the other encodings should only be chosen with some small probability ͓27͔. ͑The bit pairs resulting from the latter are then only used for parameter estimation.͒ This reduces the number of qubit pairs lost in the sifting step.
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One might use the lemma C.1 ͑with E = F = E Bell ͒ to get a quantitative statement.
Using these identities, it follows from Eq. ͑7͒ that the final key generated by the protocol of the previous section, for fixed channels U ← X and V ← U, is secure as long as its length is not larger than
for AB = 1 ͓Q͔. In other words, ᐉ U←X,V←U ͓ AB ͔ is the length of a secure key that can be extracted when applying the protocol to a state of the form AB͉Q W =Q n data . Since the final key must be secure for all possible initial states for which the protocol does not abort, we have to take the minimum of this quantity over the states AB = 1 ͓Q͔, for any Q P E Bell ͓⌫ QBER ͔. Since, according to Eq. ͑10͒, 1 ͓Q͔ is diagonal, the minimum ranges over all diagonal states AB diag whose diagonal elements correspond to Q P E Bell ͑⌫ QBER ͒. This is equivalent to saying that the diagonal elements of AB diag are equal to the diagonal entries of a density operator AB ⌫ QBER ; i.e., the number ᐉ of key bits generated by the protocol is given by
This concludes the proof of Eq. ͑11͒ and thus also Eq. ͑9͒.
IV. UPPER BOUND ON THE SECRET-KEY RATE
As demonstrated in Sec. III, the rate of a QKD protocol is lower bounded by an expression which only involves von Neumann entropies of states of single-qubit pairs ͓cf. Eq. ͑9͔͒. In the following, we show that, roughly speaking, the right-hand side of Eq. ͑9͒ is also an upper bound on the rate if the supremum is taken over all quantum channels ͑instead of only classical channels͒ U ← X and V ← X.
Clearly, in order to prove upper bounds, it is sufficient to consider collective attacks. We thus assume that the overall state ABE n of Alice's, Bob's, and Eve's quantum system has product form-i.e., ABE n = ABE n -for some tripartite state ABE . Hence, before starting with the classical processing, the situation is fully specified by the n-fold product state XYE n , where XYE is the state obtained when applying Alice's and Bob's measurements to ABE . Similarly to Eq. ͑4͒, XYE can be written as
We show that the rate r͑ XYE ͒ at which secret-key bits can be generated from this situation, using only a public communication channel from Alice and Bob, is upper bounded by
In this formula, the supremum is taken over all density operators U x and V x depending on x. The density operators occurring in the entropies are then given by the appropriate traces of
A similar upper bound for the key rate follows from a result of Devetak and Winter ͓28͔. In contrast to Eq. ͑13͒, their formula involves an additional limes over the number n of product states, whereas the supremum only involves classical channels U ← X and V ← U.
Because of the optimization over the density operators U x and V x , expression ͑13͒ is generally hard to evaluate. To simplify this computation, it is convenient to consider measurements of Eve, resulting in classical values Z. In this case, the bound corresponds to a known result due to Csiszár and Körner ͓29͔,
The proof of the upper bound ͑13͒ is subdivided into two parts: First, in Sec. IV A, we give general conditions on a measure M such that M͑ XYE ͒ is an upper bound on the rate r XYE . Second, in Sec. IV B, we show that the measure M defined by the right-hand side of Eq. ͑13͒ satisfies these conditions.
A. General properties of upper bounds
Let M be a real-valued function on the set of tripartite density operators. We show that M͑ XYE ͒ is an upper bound on the rate r XYE if the following conditions are satisfied ͓here, we also write M͑X ; Y ; E͒ instead of M͑ XYE ͒; moreover, if a random variable XЈ is computed from X, we write XЈ ← X͔:
͑v͒ There exists a function ␣ with lim →0 ␣͑͒ = 0 such that, for any state S A S B E describing an -secure key pair of length ᐉ ͓cf. Eq. ͑5͔͒,
Consider an arbitrary secret-key agreement protocol and assume that the protocol starts with n copies of the state XYE . Let S A S B E Ј n be the overall state of Alice's and Bob's key S A and S B , respectively, together with the adversary's information EЈ after the protocol execution. Then, using properties ͑i͒-͑iv͒, we find
For any n N, the resulting state must be ͑n͒ close to a state describing a secret key of length ᐉ͑n͒, for ͑n͒ → 0 as n approaches infinity. Hence, from Eq. ͑16͒ and property ͑v͒,
which concludes the proof.
B. Concrete expression for the upper bound
Let M be the measure defined by the right-hand side of Eq. ͑13͒; i.e., for any tripartite density operator XYE , M͑ XYE ͒ ª M͑X ; Y ; E͒ is given by
The goal of this section is to show that this measure satisfies the conditions of Sec. IV A, which implies that M͑ XYE ͒ is an upper bound on the secret-key rate r͑ XYE ͒.
Let us start with property ͑i͒. It suffices to show that, for any state 
V. EXAMPLES: THE SIX-STATE, BB84, AND B92 PROTOCOLS
To compute expression ͑9͒ for the secret-key rate, we have to optimize over the choices of the channels U ← X and V ← U used for the classical processing. Clearly, every choice of these channels gives a lower bound on the rate. Surprisingly, for the QKD protocols considered below, a good choice is to define U as a noisy version of X, while V is set to a constant; i.e., it can be discarded. For the protocol, this means that, before doing error correction, Alice should simply add some noise to her measurement data. Intuitively, this puts Bob into a better position than Eve, since the effect of this noise on the correlation between Alice and Eve is worse than on those between Alice and Bob.
A. Six-state protocol
The six-state protocol ͓5͔ uses three different encodings, defined by the z basis ͕͉0͘ z , ͉1͘ z ͖, the x basis ͕͉0͘ x , ͉1͘ x ͖
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Let ABZ be a tripartite quantum state of the form ABZ = ͚ z P Z ͑z͒ AB z P ͉z͘ , where ͕͉z͖͘ is a family of orthonormal vectors. We say that A ← Z ← B is a Markov chain if ABZ = ͚ z P Z ͑z͒ A z B z P ͉z͘ ; i.e., the state in the subsystem A is fully determined by the classical value z.
ª ͕1/ ͱ 2͉͑0͘ z ± ͉1͘ z ͖͒, and the y basis ͕͉0͘ y , ͉1͘ y ͖ ª ͕1/ ͱ 2͉͑0͘ z ± i͉1͘ z ͖͒. Alice and Bob measure the QBER for each of these encodings. This gives three conditions on the diagonal entries 1 , ... , 4 ͑with respect to the Bell basis͒ of the states AB contained in the set ⌫ QBER over which we have to minimize ͓see Eq. ͑9͔͒. In particular, if the QBER equals Q for all encodings, we get 3 + 4 = Q, 2 + 4 = Q, and 2 + 3 = Q. Together with the normalization, we immediately find 1 =1− 3 2 Q and 2 = 3 = 4 = 1 2 Q. In order to evaluate the entropies occurring in expression ͑9͒, we need to consider a purification ͉͘ ABE of the diagonalization D 2 ͑ AB ͒ of AB -i.e.,
where ͉⌽ 1 ͘ AB , ... ,͉⌽ 4 ͘ AB denote the Bell states in Alice and Bob's joint system ͑with respect to the z basis 19 ͒ and where ͉ 1 ͘ E , ... ,͉ 4 ͘ E are some mutually orthogonal states in Eve's system. It is easy to verify that, if Alice and Bob apply their measurements ͑with respect to the z basis͒, resulting in outcomes x and y, respectively, the state of Eve's system is given by ͉ x,y ͘, where
In particular, the density operators E 0 and E 1 describing Eve's system, if Alice has the value 0 or 1, respectively, are given by
We can write these states with respect to the basis , where Ϯ is a plus sign if x = 0 and a minus sign if x =1. As mentioned above, we define U as a noisy version of X, with bit-flip probability q-i.e., P U͉X=0 ͑1͒ = P U͉X=1 ͑0͒ = q. Moreover, V is set to a constant, which means that it can simply be omitted. Using the fact that S͑UE͒ = H͑U͒ + S͑E ͉ U͒ and, similarly, H͑UY͒ = H͑U͒ + H͑Y ͉ U͒, the entropy difference on the right-hand side in the supremum of Eq. ͑9͒ is given by
Furthermore, H͑Y͒ = 1 and
where h is the binary entropy function. These expressions can easily be evaluated numerically. For an optimal choice of the parameter q, we get a positive secret-key rate if Q ഛ 0.141. Without the preprocessing, we obtain the known bound Q ഛ 0.126 ͓13͔ ͑see Fig. 1͒ . Remarkably, this bound has already been improved to Q ഛ 0.127 ͓13͔ using degenerate quantum codes, which can be interpreted as a certain type of pre-processing.
Another method to obtain conditions on the set ⌫ QBER in Eq. ͑9͒ is to use some additional symmetrization. For this, we consider the operator D 1 as defined by Eq. ͑3͒ with
where V x , V y , and V z denote the unitary operators transforming the z basis into the x, y, and z bases, respectively. This implies that D 2 (D 1 ͑ AB ͒) = 1 P ͉⌽ + ͘ + 2 P ͉⌽ − ͘ + 3 P ͉⌿ + ͘ + 4 P ͉⌿ − ͘ , where 3 + 4 =2 2 . As explained in ͓22͔, we can, instead of D 2 , apply another symmetrization operation D 2 Ј͑͒, e.g.,
Apart from depolarizing any state to a Belldiagonal state, this map also equalizes the coefficients 3 and 4 in Eq. ͑10͒. This implies that D 2 Ј͑D 1 ͑⌫ QBER ͒͒ = ͕͑1 −3Q /2͒P ͉⌽ +͘ + Q /2͑P ͉⌽ −͘ + P ͉⌿ + ͘ + P ͉⌿ − ͘ ͖͒. Thus, using this method, we find right away all the necessary conditions on the set ⌫ QBER .
Finally, we can use Eq. ͑15͒ to compute an upper bound on the secret-key rate of the one-way six-state protocol. Let again ͉ 0,0 ͘ and ͉ 1,1 ͘ be the states of Eve conditioned on the 19 We assume here that the encoding with respect to the z basis is chosen with probability almost 1 ͑see also the discussion in Sec. III and ͓27͔͒ such that the number of bit pairs discarded in the sifting step is negligible. 
B. BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol ͓4͔ is very similar to the six-state protocol, but uses only two of the three bases for the encoding. Hence, one only gets two conditions on the diagonal entries 1 , ... , 4 ͑with respect to the Bell basis͒ of the density operator AB : namely, 3 + 4 = Q and 2 + 4 = Q. Hence, the set ⌫ QBER contains all states with diagonal entries 1 =1 −2Q + 4 and 2 = 3 = Q − 4 , for any 4 ͓0,Q͔.
The evaluation of Eq. ͑9͒ now follows the same lines as described above for the six-state protocol. A straightforward calculation shows that, independently of the amount of noise added in the preprocessing, expression ͑9͒ takes its minimum for 4 = Q 2 . When optimizing over the preprocessing ͑i.e., the amount of noise introduced by Alice͒ we get a positive rate if Q ഛ 0.124 ͑see Fig. 2͒ . Note that, without the preprocessing, we obtain Q ഛ 0.110, which is exactly the bound due to Shor and Preskill ͓12͔. Computing the upper bound ͑15͒ reproduces the known result saying that the ͑one-way͒ secret-key rate is zero if Q ജ 0.146 ͓30͔.
C. B92 protocol
In contrast to the BB84 and six-state protocols, Alice uses two nonorthogonal states ͓6͔ ͉ 0 ͘ = ␣͉0͘ + ␤͉1͘ and ͉ 1 ͘ = ␣͉0͘ − ␤͉1͘ to encode her bit values 0 and 1, respectively, where ␣ and ␤ are ͑without loss of generality͒ real coefficients with ␣ 2 + ␤ 2 = 1. Bob randomly applies a measurement with respect to the basis
where ͉ x ͘ Ќ denotes the normalized vector orthogonal to ͉ x ͘, for x =0,1. He then assigns the bit values 0 and 1 to the measurement outcomes ͉ 1 ͘ Ќ and ͉ 0 ͘ Ќ , respectively. In the sifting step, Alice and Bob discard all bit pairs where Bob mea-
In order to evaluate expression ͑9͒, we will rely on some of the calculations presented in ͓20͔. Note that, in contrast to the BB84 or six-state protocol, the sifting only depends on the measurement outcomes of Bob. Therefore, we consider the operation D 1 ͓see Eq. ͑3͔͒ defined by
We then need to minimize over the set ⌫ QBER containing all states AB which are compatible with the QBER and, in addition, can result from D 1 applied to any two-qubit density operator AB which corresponds to a collective attack of Eve-i.e., AB =tr E ͑1 A U BE P ͉⌽ +͘ AB ͉0͘ E 1 A U BE † ͒ for some unitary operation U BE . In ͓20͔, explicit conditions on the diagonal entries ͑with respect to the Bell basis͒ of these states have been computed. In particular, the first two diagonal entries are 1 = ͑1−Q͒͑1+s͒ / 2 and 2 = ͑1−Q͒͑1−s͒ / 2 where s is the scalar product between the states of the adversary, conditioned on the event that Alice and Bob have the values ͑0, 0͒ and ͑1, 1͒, respectively. This characterization is already sufficient to obtain reasonable lower bounds on the rate ͑9͒.
Similarly to the previous examples, adding noise on Alice's side turns out to be useful. The results of our computations are summarized in Fig. 3 , parametrized by the noise ␦ of a corresponding depolarizing channel ‫ۋ‬ ͑1−2␦͒ + ␦1.
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The rate is positive as long as ␦ ഛ 0.0278 ͑compared to ␦ 0.0240 without noise ͓15,20͔͒. Within the region shown in the figure, the relation between the parameter ␦ and the QBER is Q Ϸ 2␦.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We have analyzed a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing, thereby using a technique 20 For any given value of the QBER, the value ␦ is defined as the parameter of a depolarizing channel ‫ۋ‬ ͑1−2␦͒ + ␦1 which produces the same QBER when employing the protocol.
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In general we have Q = ␦ / ͑␥ 2 ͑1−2␦͒ +2␦͒, where
FIG. 2.
Lower bound on the secret-key rate of the BB84 protocol as a function of the QBER Q. The dashed line represents the known result ͓4͔, whereas the solid line shows our new lower bound. The inset shows the optimal value q opt for the probability by which Alice has to flip her bits in the preprocessing phase. which is not based on entanglement purification. We have shown that, in order to guarantee security against the most general attacks, it is sufficient to consider collective attacks. Moreover, we have derived a new general lower bound on the secret-key rate ͓formula ͑9͔͒ which is very similar to the well-known expression for the classical one-way secret-key rate due to Csiszár and Körner ͓29͔. While the latter applies if the information of the adversary is purely classical ͑i.e., if she is restricted to individual attacks͒, expression ͑9͒ can be seen as a quantum version of it.
In order to evaluate Eq. ͑9͒, one only needs to optimize over a certain set of two-qubit density operators, which is characterized by the possible collective attacks on the specific protocol. We have illustrated this for some of the most popular QKD schemes: namely the BB84, the six-state, and the B92-protocols, with one-way classical post-processing, say, from Alice to Bob. Surprisingly, our results imply that the performance of these protocols can be increased if Alice introduces noise to her measurement data. In particular, we get new lower bounds on the maximum tolerated channel noise which are between 10% and 15% larger than the previously known ones.
While our method allows one to exactly analyze the security of a general class of QKD protocols with one-way post-processing, it is still an open problem to identify the protocols which achieve the maximum rate. In particular, we do not know whether a bitwise preprocessing is optimal or whether it might be more advantageous for Alice and Bob to process larger blocks. Note, however, that the upper bound ͑13͒ on the secret-key rate of one-way protocols essentially has the same form as the lower bound ͑9͒, but involves a maximization over certain quantum states instead of only classical random variables. The question of whether bitwise preprocessing is optimal thus reduces to the problem of proving that these two expressions are equal.
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APPENDIX A: SMOOTH RÉNYI ENTROPY
Basic properties
Smooth Rényi entropy has been introduced in ͓23͔ in order to characterize fundamental properties of classical random variables. For instance, the -smooth Rényi entropy of order 0 of a random variable X conditioned on Y, denoted H 0 ͑X ͉ Y͒, measures the minimum length of an encoding C of X such that X can be reconstructed from C and Y, except with probability roughly . Similarly, the -smooth Rényi entropy of order 2, denoted H 2 ͑X ͉ Y͒, quantifies the amount of uniform randomness independent of Y that can be extracted from X ͑with probability roughly 1 − ͒.
The formal definition of smooth Rényi entropy H ␣ ͑of order ␣, for ␣ ͓0,ϱ͔͒ looks very similar to the definition of ͑conventional͒ Rényi entropy H ␣ ͓31͔. Indeed, the -smooth Rényi entropy H ␣ ͑X͒ of a random variable X with distribution P X can be seen as the minimum ͑if ␣ Ͻ 1͒ or maximum ͑if ␣ Ͼ 1͒ Rényi entropy H ␣ ͑Q͒ of any probability distribution Q which is close to P X . Here, the distance between P X and Q is measured with respect to the statistical distance ͑also called variational distance͒ ␦͑·, ·͒, which is the classical analog of the trace distance ␦͑·, ·͒.
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Definition A.1. The -smooth Rényi entropy ͑of order ␣ ͓0,ϱ͔͒ of a probability distribution P is 23
where the infimum ranges over all probability distributions Q such that ␦͑P , Q͒ ഛ. For a random variable X with probability distribution P X , we also write H ␣ ͑X͒ instead of
In particular, for = 0, the smooth Rényi entropy is equal to the conventional Rényi entropy. Similarly to the above definition, the conditional Rényi entropy H ␣ ͑X ͉ Y͒ is defined by taking the maximum ͑if ␣ Ͻ 1͒ or minimum ͑if ␣ Ͼ 1͒ value of the smooth Rényi entropy of the probability distributions P X͉Y=y , for any possible value of y. In ͓19͔, the notion of smooth Rényi entropy has been generalized to quantum states. For a density operator , we denote by S ␣ ͑͒ the -smooth 
and, similarly, for ␣ =0,
Let and Ј be two density operators which are diagonal with respect to the same basis and let P and PЈ be the probability distributions defined by the eigenvalues of and Ј, respectively. Then ␦͑P , PЈ͒ = ␦͑ , Ј͒.
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If ␣ =0 or ␣ = ϱ, H ␣ ͑P͒ is defined by the continuous extension,
Consider now a bipartite state UZ on H U H Z where the second part is purely classical, i.e., 
Proof. Let E z be the projectors defined by the measurement E and let Ũ Z be the state as defined in the proof of lemma A.2. Since, by assumption, the ranges of the operators E z , for z Z, are mutually orthogonal, the states Ũ Z and Ũ have the same eigenvalues and thus S ␣ ͑Ũ Z͒ = S ␣ ͑Ũ ͒. Using this identity, ͑A21͒ follows from ͑A19͒ and ͑A5͒,
Similarly, ͑A22͒ follows from ͑A16͒ and ͑A7͒,
To prove ͑A23͒, we use ͑A16͒ and ͑A8͒,
Finally, ͑A24͒ follows from ͑A20͒ and ͑A5͒, The goal of this section is to derive an expression for the smooth Rényi entropies of a symmetric state over n subsystems in terms of the von Neumann entropy of a corresponding state over only one subsystem.
Let 1 , ... , d be density operators on H U and let U n be the symmetric state over H U n defined by
where, for any n ⌫ d n ª ͕͑n 1 , ... ,n d ͒ : ͚ i n i = n͖, n are nonnegative coefficients such that ͚ n n =1.
Similarly The proof of lemma A.4 is based on the fact that there exists a measurement on U ͓͔ n such that the resulting state, conditioned on a certain measurement outcome, is equal to the state U n . The assertion then follows from the observation that this measurement does only change the entropies by a small constant.
We start with the proof of a restricted version of the statement, formulated as lemma A.5 below, which holds for states of the form ͑A25͒ where only one of the weights n is nonzero. Let ͉ 1 ͘ , ... ,͉ d ͘ H U H W be purifications of the states 1 , ... , d , respectively, such that the partial traces tr U ͑P ͉i͘ ͒ are mutually orthogonal. For n = ͑n 1 , ... ,n d ͒ ⌫ d n , let
where S n denotes the set of all permutations on n-tuples. Similarly, for = ͑ 1 , ... , d ͒, let
͑A28͒
Lemma A.5. Let UW n ͓n͔ ª P ͉͘ UW n be the pure state defined by ͑A27͒, for some fixed n = ͑n 1 , ... ,n d ͒ ⌫ d n , and let VW n ͓n͔ ª ͑E 1 W ͒ n ͑ UW n ͓n͔͒.
Moreover, for 
Let ͑E 1 W ͒͑͒ = ͚ ␣=1 m Ē ␣ Ē ␣ † be the operator-sum representation of E 1 W . Moreover, for any ␣ ª ͑␣ 1 , ... ,␣ n ͒, let Ē ␣ ª Ē ␣ 1 ¯ Ē ␣ n . The above equality can then be rewritten as
It suffices to verify that equality holds for any term in the sum, i.e.,
for any n-tuple ␣ = ͑␣ 1 , ... ,␣ n ͒ on ͕1, ... ,m͖. Because of the definition of the projectors P i , we have P i Ē ␣ ͉ j ͘ = Ē ␣ ͉ j ͘, if i = j, and P i Ē ␣ ͉ j ͘ = 0 otherwise. Hence, for any ͉ i 1 ,. . .,i n ͘ where The assertion then follows from the observation that P Z ͑0͒ ജ 1/n, which implies Ј ജ/2n, and the fact that the smooth Rényi entropy of product states approaches the von Neumann entropy ͓see ͑A18͔͒. ᮀ Proof of lemma A.4. It is easy to see that it suffices to prove the assertion for one specific purification of the states U n and U . By the definition of the vectors ͉ i ͘, the subspaces H W n are orthogonal for distinct n ⌫ d n . Hence, there exists a projective measurement F onto the subspaces H U H W n . Consider the state Ṽ W obtained when applying F to VW n , and let Z be the classical outcome; i.e., Z takes values from the set ⌫ d n .
The entropy S ␣ ͑Ṽ n W n ͉ Z = n͒ of the state Ṽ W n after the measurement, conditioned on Z = n, is equal to the entropy of VW n ͓n͔ as defined by lemma A.5-i.e.,
S ␣
͑Ṽ W ͉Z = n͒ = S ␣ ͑ VW n ͓n͔͒.
Hence, from ͑A21͒ and ͑A14͒, 
